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14 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with AECASSOWARY/29 in Washington
on Tuesday, 11 July 1961

1. The meeting in Washington was arranged for the purpose of giving AECASSOWARY/29 an opportunity to report in general on his past year's activities and experiences in Germany. AECASSOWARY/29 was met on his arrival in Washington by AECASSOWARY/15, who brought him to Bonat Restaurant, where they were joined for luncheon by [] [] [] [] [] A meeting followed the luncheon in AECASSOWARY/15's new safe office with all the above-named in attendance.

2. AECASSOWARY/29 was asked to first give a general rundown and comments on his operations in Europe. He said that, in general, the operational plan as outlined to him before his departure for Frankfurt had not been adhered to. Except for Headquarters directed assignments, he was compelled to confine himself to Germany, although he tried time and again to convince [] that if he was to be productive he had to include at least Austria and the Scandinavian countries in his area of operations. Frankfurt insisted that he first "produce something in Germany" to prove his capabilities and only then would he be permitted to expand into other areas. In AECASSOWARY/29's opinion, he wasn't ^{allowed} ~~allowed~~ to take full advantage of the opportunities available in Europe. "I asked Tony several times whether you (Headquarters) had been told about my restriction to Germany and he said that you had been." AECASSOWARY/29 had inquired as to Headquarters reaction and Tony had said that Headquarters had no choice but to agree. The situation, according to AECASSOWARY/29, had been such that he had been ready to come home in March, but when the AECASSOWARY/43 case came up he had decided to stay on until it had been completed. "I was told that if everything turned out well on this operation I might be permitted to go to France. However, it seems this operation turned out to be a complete failure and I was told there was nothing left for me to do in Germany."

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3. AECASSOWARY/29 said he was not only territorially restricted but there also was a restriction as to the type of activity in which he could engage. He was not permitted to run contact operations against Soviets travelling in western Europe, and he stated that this was "stupid." Paul said there was a basic difference of opinion between Headquarters and Frankfurt as to how the AECASSOWARY/1 operations should be run. However, there may have been factors involved of which we were not aware which caused Frankfurt to have this attitude. He stated that certain things had to be considered before we judge those not present. Paul said that a problem we have is that each station has a geographic responsibility and it is very difficult to interest them in operational activity outside the area of their direct responsibility. This has been a common experience with similar organizations. He reassured AECASSOWARY/29 that there had been no change in our thinking as to what we wanted the AECASSOWARY/1 group to do. There had been a meeting of minds on what we want to do before AECASSOWARY/29 left for Frankfurt, and there was no difference in our thinking now. We felt then and still believe that the AECASSOWARY/1 operations officer should not be limited to an artificially restricted area but be used in the areas where the operational possibilities lie. Insofar as Great Britain was concerned, the British had not agreed to AECASSOWARY/29's operating in that area and we were not inclined to press further in view of AECASSOWARY/29's imminent departure.

4. AECASSOWARY/29 stated that the [] case officer had a completely different attitude toward how he should operate. Whereas Frankfurt had insisted on having direct contact with AECASSOWARY/29's agents, [] felt that [] case officer direct contact with AECASSOWARY/29's agents should be established only when clearly desirable. [] told AECASSOWARY/29 that this aspect was another point on which we differed with Frankfurt. We ~~presumably~~ feel that the AECASSOWARY/1 operations officer should not introduce his agents to Agency personnel unless we decide that the Agency and AECASSOWARY/1 can afford to risk a possibly embarrassing compromise within the Soviet Union and without. In view of AECASSOWARY/29's training and competence and given the AECASSOWARY/1 readiness to do so, we agreed that it was within his capability to level requirements similar to those we could level.

5. A short two or three week trip to the USSR was, in AECASSOWARY/29's opinion, insufficient time for an individual to establish any good contacts. He felt it would be necessary for a man to spend three to six months in the Soviet Union in order to accomplish anything. It was explained to him that what we really needed

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was courier types and people to contact leads we had already gotten. We need people to make contacts with Soviet Ukrainians. It makes no sense for the AECASSOWARY/1 organization to send in travellers merely to gather information. The group's strength lies in the fact that they have a common bond with Soviet Ukrainians and the capability, we believe, of convincing these Soviet Ukrainians that there is some hope, some reason for them to relate themselves to us and maintain contact. Subsequently, they can be carefully exploited for intelligence under this arrangement.

6. Asked by [] whether the operational setup in Germany was satisfactory, AECASSOWARY/29 said that he had organized a net of spotters there and had discovered that it took a long time to establish a good net. Casual spotters are not the answer. A good spotter must have access to the students in the universities, to student groups, etc. He must be trained and be able to do more than just supply a list of travellers. He must know how to recognize special qualities in individuals. The spotters in Frankfurt turned out to be useful to some extent. AECASSOWARY/43, for instance, was introduced to AECASSOWARY/29 by one of his spotters. In this particular instance, AECASSOWARY/29 was introduced as a journalist who was seeking information on the Ukraine but who was able to travel there himself to get the information first hand.

7. AECASSOWARY/29 felt that one man stationed in Europe, with a net of spotters in various countries, would be able to dispatch four or five travellers a year. He said it had been his experience that a period of two years would be the minimum time in which a man could be productive, as it takes about a year to build a really good net of spotters. There is a whole new generation of young Ukrainians in Germany and in France, highly educated, who will be exploitable in another year or two. It is necessary to start working on them now. One should cover the whole Ukrainian community of Europe in order to find sufficient potential. Provided the timing is right, one man can accomplish this with a number of spotters and dispatch about four or five travellers each year. The operational season stretches from April into October, so that the other five months can be used for spotting and training of personnel.

8. It is not necessary, according to AECASSOWARY/29, to have a special net of individuals for contact operations against Soviets travelling in the West. The AECASSOWARY/1 organization has at its disposal the people who are engaged in their political and propaganda activities on whom they can call in time of need. The only thing necessary here would be to have steady communications established with these people in each area.

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9. AECASSOWARY/29 talked about his experiences with AECASSOWARY/43. As a result of this operation, he was convinced that a potential traveller's observation and reporting capabilities should be tested in advance. He felt it important not to overload the traveller with requirements and instructions. He said he realized now that it was necessary to brief certain individuals on how they should act in every possible situation, otherwise the individual becomes flustered in even the most common situation.

10. Regarding the potential student traveller whom AECASSOWARY/29 was supposed to brief in Paris, he said that [] wanted to be informed whether or not the man would be going to the Soviet Union this year. He told AECASSOWARY/29 that he was going to apply for a year's study in the USSR but at present nothing is definite. AECASSOWARY/29 was told to inform the man that, although there is nothing definite in mind for him at the moment, he would keep in touch with him.

11. AECASSOWARY/29 was asked about his personal feelings about this type of work. His reply was, "Well, I don't hate it. This is not new to me. I was very frustrated in Frankfurt, but otherwise I don't mind it. I am willing to work under any program of responsibility assigned to me, provided I am not put into a strait jacket again." He said there was nothing in his personal life to interfere with his accepting an assignment in Europe on a semi-permanent basis. He was willing to return on a permanent, indefinite basis but, he said, "I don't want another Tony. However, I don't blame him personally. If I have anything against anyone in Frankfurt, it probably is his boss."

12. Paul stated that, unfortunately, there was no one in Frankfurt who really understood the basis of our collaboration with the AECASSOWARY/1 group. They had had some unfortunate experiences with similar groups and had, as a result, some strong opinions about working with emigre organizations and principal agents. Frankfurt was chosen because of the technical and administrative support which would be available there. However, AECASSOWARY/29 could possibly be based elsewhere. Belgium was one area we might consider. Belgian documentation could probably be arranged and there the local service wouldn't be much of a problem to contend with. Paris was another possibility, although there we would have to deal with a sharper and more interested local service. Asked about his area preference if ~~was~~ given a choice of location, AECASSOWARY/29 said it didn't matter so long as he had freedom of movement. He said any place but Frankfurt would be acceptable.

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13. It was AECASSOWARY/29's feeling that because of his connection with AEBEEHIVE, Frankfurt thought he was primarily interested in AEBEEHIVE propaganda activity. He said, "They were obsessed with the idea that I came there to be engaged in political work for the organization. A little political contact might have been helpful operationally, but I avoided it. I am not going to complain about Tony. I think he did all he could to facilitate the operation, but it seemed to me that somebody else was holding him back. Whatever I suggested, he would say, 'I am sorry, my boss is against it.' I was told I would not be permitted to go anywhere until I proved in Germany my capabilities in running an operation." He complained also of undue urgency and pressure to the detriment of a firmly-backed long-range program. He felt the Station considered the mere running of a traveller to be the first priority, without due consideration for the real goals of the operation.

14. AECASSOWARY/29 said there had been no problem with his documentation, and no security problems. He was not questioned by other emigres as to his activities and his presence in Europe.

15. The reasons for AECASSOWARY/29's not stopping in England on his return to the United States were discussed. AECASSOWARY/29 said it was very doubtful he would have obtained a British visa. The British questioned him about his connection with AEBEEHIVE and about the group's activities. They told him they couldn't be sure about when a visa would be issued him, that it might take as long as a month or more. AECASSOWARY/29 felt they probably would not issue it to him at all. He expressed some doubts about the wisdom of his submitting to Frankfurt the names of those people in England whom he was planning to assess. He feared it might cause them difficulties with the British. He was assured this would not be the case, as the names were only submitted for clearance for the purpose of his travelling to England to contact and assess them.

16. Our reaction to AECASSOWARY/29 and his ideas was positive. He did not seem embittered, but he was clearly unwilling under any conditions to allow himself to be put into a similar situation again. Personally AECASSOWARY/29 seemed to have matured considerably and failed to show some of the pedantic characteristics which he exhibited a year ago. He is a better man now than he was then and the experience, as unsatisfying as it was, has done him personal good.

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17. It is our opinion that AECASSOWARY/29 has the capability of becoming highly competent in the REDSKIN field, both in and out. He has the potential for professionalism which is so often lacking in emigres. In many ways he seems superior to AECASSOWARY/15, who does not seem to possess AECASSOWARY/29's clarity of thought and decisiveness (nor his energy, we fear). AECASSOWARY/29 sees things clearly and knows what he wants to do.

18. AECASSOWARY/29 will return to Washington ca. 18 July for an extended stay to work with AECASSOWARY/15 and receive more training and briefing. It will be enlightening to see how he affects our present project doldrum (in the REDSKIN traveller field). We should like to consider soonest the question of his reassignment to Europe.

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